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Two different signal processing algorithms are described for detection and classification of acoustic
signals generated by firearm discharges in small enclosed spaces. The first is based on the logarithm
of the signal energy. The second is a joint entropy. The current study indicates that a system using
both signal energy and joint entropy would be able to both detect weapon discharges and classify
weapon type, in small spaces, with high statistical certainty. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.4948994]
[MRB]

Pages: 2723–2731

I. INTRODUCTION

We report on methods to both detect and classify firearm discharges in small, enclosed, environments with high
statistical certainty. Some algorithms reported on here are
capable of running on an embedded microcontroller system
(Texas Instruments FRAM micro-controller unit number
MSP430FR5989) that, with an associated microphone
(InvenSense INMP404ACEZ-R7 microphone), is capable
of signal acquisition and analysis. Moreover, such a system
and software are suitable for wide-scale deployment in
classrooms, movie theaters, and other public gathering
places.
Implementation on a microcontroller limits the sophistication of algorithms that may be employed. In addition, we have
found that the governing dynamics of acoustic propagation
and signal acquisition are highly nonlinear. Consequently, we
have focused on approaches that reduce a waveform, or a subsegment of a waveform f(t), to a single number. This number,
or receiver value, is then intended to be used as the basis for
signal identification. Signal energy, or its logarithm, denoted
log½Ef , combined with careful signal filtering has been shown
to provide a good balance between computational complexity
and statistical sensitivity. Our results show that signal energy
analysis is able to clearly discriminate between firearm discharges and other acoustic background events, but not necessarily between firearm types.
This information is a critical factor in determining first
responder tactics and strategy. To address the need to identify weapon types from their acoustic signatures, we have
investigated various entropies as previous studies have demonstrated their utility for analysis of ultrasonic signals in
both materials characterization and medical ultrasonics.1–13
The current study demonstrates the utility of entropies for
analysis of acoustic signals in the audio range as well. When
used in conjunction with energy analysis it appears that
acoustic discrimination of weapon type is also possible.
a)
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There is an extensive literature on firearm discharge
detection and source identification. Previous investigations
of firearm discharge have focused on outdoor source location,14–16 and identification of firearm and ammunition type
using shockwave analysis.17,18 Other investigators have studied correlation and linear predictive coding for firearm detection and source recognition.19 Threshold detection schemes
using six different waveform characteristics, e.g., magnitude
of signal absolute value, median filter, Teager energy operator, correlation against a template, among others mainly for
outdoor gunshot detection and source classification have
been described by Chacon-Rodrıguez et al.20 More generally, extraction of acoustic cues for forensic purposes has
been investigated by Hong and colleagues.21
The current study is different from prior work in that it
considers signals acquired indoors, in relatively small enclosures. Moreover, shockwave analysis or linear analysis techniques for source identification are not used at all.
II. DATA ACQUISITION

Two different groups of acoustic data were collected for
this study. This first group consisted of “threat-type” signals,
which were acquired by discharging several different firearms into a ballistic trap: 223 caliber automatic rifle [M-16
assault rifle (Colt’s Manufacturing Company, LLC,
Hartford, CT); Fiocchi 45 grain frangible (Fiocchi of
America, Inc., Ozark, MO)]. 40 caliber semi-automatic pistol [Compact Smith & Wesson (Smith & Wesson,
Springfield, MA); S&W 125 grain frangible], 45 caliber
automatic pistol [Taurus PT 145 PRO (Taurus Inc, Miami
Lakes, FL); Fiocchi 155 grain frangible], 9 mm semiR
automatic pistol [Springfield Armory (Springfield ArmoryV
Geneseo, IL) XD9; Fiocchi 100 grain luger], 22 rifle [Marlin
model 60 (Marlin Firearms, subsidiary of Freedom Group
Madison, North Carolina); Remington 22LR 40 grain], 22
pistol [Intratec TEC-22 (Intratec Firearms, Miami, FL);
Remington (Remington Arms Company, LLC, Madison,
NC) 22LR 40 grain], 357 magnum (S&W Magnum; PMC
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158 grain), 380 caliber pistol [Taurus (Taurus International
Manufacturing, Miami Lakes, FL) PT 738; Fiocchi 380
auto], 38 special (S&W.38 Special AirLite; American Eagle
158 grain), and AK 47 [SAIGA 7.62  39 Legion
(Kalashnikov Concern, Izhevsk, Russia); Tula 7.62  39 R
124 HP]. All firearms but the M16 where provided by the
Kennewick, WA police department from their evidence
locker, the M16 was provided by their special weapons and
tactics team. This was done in order to sample an ensemble
of acoustic sources that captures the variability found in non
military/police arms, i.e., in “street” weapons. A second
group of control data was also acquired. These consisted of
“false” alarms: a book slapped on a table, an air-filled paper
bag “popping,” and a wrench striking a metal ladder.
Signals were collected in three different rooms of different dimensions: a large auditorium (12.8  8.4 m; height
2.7 m), a medium sized meeting room (4.6  6.1 m; height
2.7 m), and a small office (3.7  3.7 m; height 2.7 m).
Acquisition of all data were completed during one 10 h interval. Firearm discharge data were obtained with the assistance
of the Kennewick, WA special weapons and tactics team,
whose members volunteered to operate all firearms used in
this study. We will report on results collected in the small
room shown in Fig. 1 since this constitutes the most challenging environment in which to distinguish between threat
and nonthreat acoustic events and to discriminate between
different types of threats. The figure shows the dimensions
of the room, the placement of the microphones, location of
trap, and firearms operator. During acquisition of data, the
door to the room was closed.
Acoustic signals were converted to electrical signals
using a InvenSense INMP404ACEZ-R7 microphone connected to custom built amplifier circuitry. These signals were
digitized, single-shot fashion, by a Teledyne LeCroy MSO
104MXs B digital sampling oscilloscope to obtain raw data
consisting of one million point waveforms (12-bit numbers;
1.0 MHz sampling rate). At least five waveforms for each type
of acoustic source were acquired and stored for later analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Experimental nonlinearities

Several observations indicate that the experiment is governed, at least partially, by nonlinear dynamics occurring
during the propagation of sound as well in the microphone
during data capture. During acquisition of firearms signals,
the marksman reported the ceiling tile immediately above
the trap was being visibly displaced by the weapon discharge. Subsequent inspection of the digital waveforms on a
fine time scale (not shown) reveals evidence of shock-like
features. Moreover, the amplitude of firearm discharges in
typically in over 100 dB and this is close to the rated limit of
the microphone used in our study.
As an initial test of this hypothesis, we acquired waveforms for a single- and five-round discharge from the 223 caliber assault rifle. Figure 2 shows, in its top panel, the
waveform recorded from the discharge of one round, f1(t).
The waveform, f5 ðtÞ, for five automatic discharges is shown
in the middle panel. Both waveforms were Fourier
2724
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FIG. 1. Geometry used for acoustic signal acquisition.

transformed to obtain, respectively, F1 ðxÞ and F5 ðxÞ. If the
propagation was linear, or even weakly linear, then the inverse
Fourier transform of F5 ðxÞ=F1 ðxÞ should produce a time series having five delta function spikes. To avoid division by
zero we actually divide by a modified version of F1 ðxÞ,
specifically
F 5 ðx Þ
;
F~1 ðxÞ
where
F~1 ðxÞ ¼

(1)

(

F1 ðxÞ if jF1 ðxÞj  q;
q

if jF1 ðxÞj < q;

(2)

and q ¼ 106 is a regularizing term. The inverse Fourier transform of this function was computed and is shown in the bottom
panel of the Fig. 2. It is evident that there is no pulse train.
The strong nonlinearities exhibited by the acoustics preclude identification of signal source using signal processing
techniques based on linear systems theory such as matched filters. Instead, we will focus on techniques that take subsegments of the acoustic waveform and produce a single number
or receiver value. Moreover, repeated monitoring of microphone performance was undertaken during and after the acquisition of firearm discharge waveforms to detect signs of
damage resulting from exposure to large amplitude sound
waves. These are reported on more fully in the Appendix.
Luzi et al.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Top panel: Acoustic signature of one discharge of 223
caliber assault rifle. Middle panel: acoustic signature of automatic discharge
of five rounds. Bottom panel: The deconvolution, as discussed in connection
with Eqs. (1) and (2) below, of the five discharge by the single discharge signature. In a linear system such a deconvolution should produce a series of five
delta functions. The fact that these are not evident supports the conclusion that
acoustic wave propagation is not linear in the current study.

B. Energy and entropy analysis of waveforms

We will denote the acoustic waveforms acquired for our
study by f(t). We will also employ the convention that the
domain of f(t) is [0, 1].
For f(t), the signal energy is
ð1
(3)
Ef ¼ f ðtÞ2 dt:
0

We may also compute a joint entropy of acoustic waveforms, f(t), using a reference function g(t). In the case where
f(t) and g(t) are differentiable functions this entropy is given
by6


ð
1 1 min jf 0 ðtÞj; jg0 ðtÞj


Hf ;g  
dt
2 0 max jf 0 ðtÞj; jg0 ðtÞj
ð1



(4)
 dt log max jf 0 ðtÞj; jg0 ðtÞj :
0

The strategy for choosing the reference waveform, g(t), in
the case where subtle changes in f(t) must be detected has
been described elsewhere.7 Although these techniques are
not technically applicable for the present investigation, we
will take them as an operational starting point. The justification for this approach is twofold. In previous studies,8,9 it
has been observed that the joint entropy calculation has
many of the attributes of a matched filter. In particular, Hf ;g
is often extremized for waveforms “close” to f(t), when g0 ðtÞ
is a step-like function, with transitions located at the critical
values of f(t). In addition, Theorem 1 of a previous study of
the variational properties of joint entropy7 also suggests that
this strategy would be successful. Consequently, we will use
this approach, described in greater detail below (Fig. 4) to
discriminate between different classes of firearms.
C. Signal preprocessing

The goal of this study was to discover a suite of signal
receivers that are suitable for two different tasks: discharge
J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 139 (5), May 2016

detection vs firearm identification. Consequently, after an
initial “gating” operation to remove the noise-only pre-trigger portion of the digital waveform, two different preprocessing schemes were applied to the raw data, prior to
computation of either signal energy or entropy.
For signal energy computations the data were decimated
(i.e., only every tenth point was kept) and then bandpass filtered to exclude frequencies outside of the range extending
from 1 to 26 kHz. This was accomplished in the frequency
domain by multiplying the Fourier transform of the raw data
by the conjugate symmetric form of






f  fl:b:
fu:b:  f Þ
þ 1 tanh
þ1
tanh
a
a
;
(5)
4
where fl:b: ¼ 103 ; fu:b: ¼ 26  103 , and the sharpness parameter for the filter was set to a ¼ 10. All computations are performed using units of Hertz.
The logarithm of the signal energy was computed,
according to Eq. (3) using 2.56 ms segments of the acoustic
waveforms. The analysis was performed using a “moving
window” analysis where the 2.56 ms window was placed
initially at a point coincident with the signal arrival and the
logarithm of the signal energy was computed. Subsequently,
the window was moved in 2.56 ms steps, until the end of the
data were reached. In this way, an array of signal energy
log values was produced. In this study it was observed that
analysis with the window placed at zero time was adequate
for source classification.
For entropy calculations only 32 ls segments of the
acoustic waveforms were analyzed in moving window fashion,
with a moving window shift of 1 ls. The rationale for the
shorter window length was that its structure would be primarily determined by the attributes of the firearm and not those of
the environment. As in the signal energy case, it was found
that analysis with the window placed at zero time was
adequate for source classification. This observation and sensitivity to placement and length of the moving window will be
more fully explained below in connection with Fig. 6.
IV. RESULTS
A. “Threat” vs “nonthreat”

Each of the waveforms acquired for each source type
were analyzed as described above to obtain either log
energy, log½Ef , or joint entropy, Hf ;g . The mean and standard deviations of the ensemble for each source were then
computed.
Figure 3 shows the results obtained for the log½Ef 
analysis. The error bars in the plot are equal to one standard
deviation. There is wide separation between the threat-type
and nonthreat-type bars. However, there appears to be little
separation between either the 223 caliber (M16) and AK47
(“long rifles”) and any pistols. This would be useful information in certain circumstances.
In order to quantify this separation, the pair-wise differences between each acoustic source were computed
along with associated standard deviation using the standard
Luzi et al.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Separation of “threat-type” vs “nonthreat-type” by
the logarithm of signal energy, log½Ef .

methods for error propagation.22 From these, the mean difference, which can be either positive or negative, divided by
the associated standard deviation was computed in order to
obtain a noise-normalized measure of change between receiver values for different acoustic sources. This ratio, which
we will use to quantify the sensitivity of analysis techniques,
is often defined as the statistical confidence,23 and is the reciprocal of the coefficient of variation of a random variable.
Larger values are better as they imply greater statistical separation between random variables, in our case signal
receivers. Small values suggest that the sources are statistically indistinguishable to the signal receiver.
The confidence values characterizing the relation
between threat-type and nonthreat-type-signals are summarized in Table I. We observe that all confidences are larger
than one, suggesting that these types of signals should be
easily distinguished using only log½Ef . Moreover, energy
calculation is simple and well suited to our goal of reduction-to-practice on low cost hardware.
B. Threat-type discrimination

As mentioned previously, discrimination between
threat-type waveforms would be useful information. Table II
summarizes the absolute values of all confidence ratios
TABLE I. Confidence ratios of “threat-type” vs “nonthreat-type” sources
using log½Ef .

223 cal. semiauto rifle
40 cal. semiauto pistol
45 cal. semiauto pistol
9 mm semiauto pistol
22 cal. semiauto rifle
22 cal. semiauto pistol
357 cal. revolver pistol
380 cal. semi auto pistol
38 special revolver pistol
AK47 semiauto rifle

2726

Book

Paper bag

Wrench

22.60
17.50
18.10
19.22
15.81
22.07
28.66
19.41
15.19
55.76

17.68
14.43
14.5
15.26
10.63
16.05
20.69
15.57
13.00
28.77

11.03
9.57
9.28
9.59
5.11
9.09
12.00
9.95
9.13
14.28
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obtained in pair-wise comparison of log½Ef  values for
threat-type sources. Only the values below the diagonal are
shown since the table is symmetric about this line. We
observe that many entries are greater than one, suggesting
that in many cases highly reliable discrimination between
sources is possible. However, there are also many entries
that are less than one. Particularly troubling is the fact that
several of these entries appear in the first column indicating
that log½Ef  provides poor discrimination between several
pistols and the assault rifle.
Consequently, we have investigated the use of different
joint entropies, Hf ;gi , as an additional tool for weapons identification. Each reference function, gi ðtÞ, was generated using
one of the threat-type waveforms according to the methods
described previously,7 for instance g1 ðtÞ was computed using
one of the 223 rile waveforms, g2 ðtÞ was computed using
one of the 40 caliber waveforms and so forth with g10 ðtÞ
being computed using one of the AK47 rifle waveforms. For
completeness, we illustrate this computation in Fig. 4. The
line with long and short dashes shows the a portion of the
bandpass filtered version of the underlying waveform coincident with the onset of the acoustic pulse generated by discharge of the 223 assault rifle. Zero time indicates the point
at which the LeCroy MSO 104MXs B digital sampling oscilloscope triggered during data acquisition when the incoming
voltage crossed the threshold level of roughly 125 mV. The
32 ls segment of this waveform, which has been selected for
Hf ;gi analysis is shown by the solid line. Solid black circles
indicate the locations of the start of this segment and its
extrema. The dashed step-like function shows a scaled version of the resulting g01 ðtÞ, which had high values of 10 000
and low values of 0.001.
An example plot of the entropies Hf ;g1 , along with associated standard deviation bars, obtained using the reference
function generated using a 223 caliber waveform is shown in
Fig. 5. The figure shows a clear separation between the “long
rifle” 223 data and the “pistol” 40 caliber, 45 caliber, and to
a lesser extent, 9 mm data. For this plot, the confidence ratios
quantifying the separation between the 223 (a “long rifle”)
and the 357 caliber and 380 caliber pistols data improves
from the Table II values of 0.16 and 0.80 to 5.58 and 5.69,
respectively. However, for the 22 caliber rifle to confidence
is decreased from its Table II value of 9.09 to 5.64.
To be thorough, we have calculated confidence tables
for joint entropy analogous to the Table II using a representative of each type of “threat” waveform, i.e., for all
gi ðtÞ; i ¼ 1; …; 10. To assess the sensitivities obtainable
using this suite of signal receivers, the maximum absolute
values for each entry in these over all 10 tables have been
collected and are shown in Table III. We observe that where
the entries of this table are low, the corresponding entries of
Table II are high and vice versa. Moreover, the maximum
always exceeds one.
C. Effect of changing analysis parameters, particularly
moving window placement

We have explored other values for bandpass filter lower
and upper bound, moving window length, moving window
Luzi et al.
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TABLE II. Confidence ratios for different “threat-type” sources obtained using log½Ef  analysis.

223 cal. semiauto rifle (M16)
40 cal. semiauto pistol
45 cal. semiauto pistol
9 mm semiauto pistol
22 cal. semiauto rifle
22 cal. semiauto pistol
357 cal. revolver pistol
380 cal. semiauto pistol
38 special revolver pistol
AK47 semiauto rifle

223

40 Cal.

45 Cal.

9 mm

22 Cal (R)

22 Cal (P)

357 Cal

380 Cal

38 Spc.

AK 47

0.59
1.48
1.40
9.09
3.37
0.16
0.80
0.04
1.55

0.76
0.66
6.98
2.23
0.78
0.14
0.44
1.96

0.12
6.57
1.47
1.78
0.66
1.13
3.28

7.00
1.67
1.71
0.55
1.05
3.29

6.32
10.92
7.49
6.50
16.96

4.10
2.26
2.43
7.07

1.03
0.16
1.77

0.58
2.43

1.06

-

step in the course of our investigations. The choice of bandpass filter parameters is largely governed by the response
characteristics of microphone and where chosen primarily to
eliminate electronic noise outside of the spectral response of
that device. However, the choice of moving window parameters appears to be less constrained and during the course of
our investigations the impact of varying these over a range
of values was explored. For signal energy analysis it was
found that windows containing at least half of the waveforms
were suitable for classification. However, entropy analysis
appears to be more tightly constrained, particularly in connection with the, more difficult, problem of classification of
weapon type. Consequently, we now present additional
information of the choice of values reported.
Our primary criterion for utility was that these parameters cover a continuous range of values. We have found that
for window length the values reported above may be more
than doubled before entropy analysis is unable to distinguish
weapon types. While moving window position, which was
computed for an array of values, and should be chosen to
capture physical events is not sensibly characterized this
way, we have found that it may be chosen in an interval that
is long enough to be easily captured by current digital acquisition devices. We focus on the comparison of 223 assault
rifle and 40 caliber pistol in the discussion that follows as it

FIG. 4. (Color online) An illustration of the steps used to calculate a reference waveform for the 223 caliber assault rifle. The dashed step-like function is the derivative of the calculated reference function g01 ðtÞ, which is
shown instead of the reference g1 ðtÞ, since its relation to the extrema of
32 ls segment is more easily visualized.
J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 139 (5), May 2016

is a typical result. The sensitivity of Hf ;g analysis to this
parameter is illustrated in three panels shown in Fig. 6,
where the analysis of a waveform captured from discharge
of the 223 caliber assault rifle is compared with a discharge
from a 40 caliber pistol. In the top panel are shown 110 ls
segments that capture the arrival of the acoustic waveforms
at the sensor. We observe that the shape of the pulses at first
arrival is noticeably different. This observation motivated
the entropy analysis investigation, which previous reports
have shown is more sensitive to changes in shape of waveforms than is signal energy analysis.24 The middle panel
shows the curves for processed raw data (as described in
Sec. III C) overlain with circular symbols placed at the locations of the 32 time domain points used to compute Hf ;g
incorporated into Fig. 5). Also shown in the middle panel is
a gray region containing twenty points that were also used
as the starting points for 32 l windows over which Hf ;g was
computed as part of the moving window analysis as
described in Sec. III C. The bottom panel shows the resulting
Hf ;g for both firearms. Only the first four and the last three
points, where the error bars of the firearms overlap, fail to
distinguish the two weapon types. These results, which are
also typical of signal energy, show that the reported Hf ;g
results summarized in Fig. 5 are, at least to the order of a

FIG. 5. (Color online) Separation of the acoustic signatures of different firearms by joint entropy, Hf ;g . The reference was computed using a step-like
function with transitions at the extrema of one of the 223 assault rifle waveforms. Note vertical axis constant offset of 104.2.
Luzi et al.
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TABLE III. Maximum confidence ratios for different “threat-type” sources obtained using Hf ;g analysis for gi ðtÞ derived from different acoustic sources as
described in Sec. IV B.

223 cal. rifle semiauto rifle(M16)
40 cal. semiauto pistol
45 cal. semiauto pistol
9 mm semiauto pistol
22 cal. semiauto rifle
22 cal. semiauto pistol
357 cal. revolver pistol
380 cal. semiauto pistol
38 special revolver pistol
AK47 semiauto rifle

223

40 Cal.

45 Cal.

9 mm

22 Cal. (R)

22 Cal. (P)

357 Cal

380 Cal

38 Spc.

AK 47

8.61
8.63
1.48
5.64
4.30
5.58
5.69
4.06
5.67

1.42
1.00
53.46
38.33
40.44
59.04
16.59
37.20

0.65
29.92
18.00
27.67
31.65
17.75
26.57

7.40
9.33
9.71
9.80
6.01
9.79

1.16
0.91
1.24
1.37
0.95

1.74
1.94
0.48
1.96

0.58
1.37
0.49

1.42
0.51

1.55

-

few microseconds, insensitive to analysis window placement
as long as it primarily encompasses the arrival of the waveform. Given the capabilities of modern data acquisition
equipment in relation to the length of this window of stability, it seems reasonable to conclude that Hf ;g can provide a
robust metric for classifying acoustic signatures into different weapon-type categories.

FIG. 6. (Color online) Effect of changing analysis parameters. Top panel: raw
data for 223 caliber assault rifle and 40 caliber pistol. Middle panel: curves for
bandpass filtered data with circular symbols indicating first set of points used
for Hg;f analysis results in Fig. 3. The gray region indicates the range of starting times used to prepare the bottom panel. Bottom panel: Effect of changing
the starting time for the set of points used to compute Hf ;g .
2728
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V. DISCUSSION

The results summarized in Tables II and III suggest that
a statistical detection and identification system based on the
complementary use of the logarithm of signal energy and the
joint entropies [one for each reference function gi ðtÞ] could
be developed that would simultaneously detect discharge of
firearms and classify their type. This system could be based
on a hierarchical analysis beginning with log½Ef  analysis
to discriminate between threat and nonthreat events. If the
former were indicated by the energy analysis then subsequent firearm identification would be executed using Hf ;gi
signal receivers.
While the use of confidence ratios is a useful starting point
for quantifying the statistical separation between random variables, the hierarchical analysis indicated above would require
explicit knowledge of their distributions. Unfortunately, time
and resource limitations precluded acquisition of a large number of firearm discharges of even a single weapon type.
Nevertheless, two conclusions seem warranted. First,
and most important, is that for each firearm type there exists
a receiver, either log½Ef  or one of the entropies Hf ;gi , that is
tightly clustered with a large enough difference in mean
values between different weapon types so that even a small
sample of waveforms would be sufficient for statistical
identification. In many cases, those where confidence ratios
are larger than five, it appears that even a single weapon discharge would permit classification of a firearm into either
the category of pistol or long rifle. The case where the standard deviation (r) is less than five, identification and classification would still be possible since, unfortunately, multiple
acoustic emissions from each firearm source would likely be
available. In that case, statistical analysis could be based on
pﬃﬃﬃ
the standard deviation of the mean (r= n), which decreases
pﬃﬃﬃ
like 1= n as the number, n of waveforms of each weapon
type increases. For even a few discharges of each weapon
pﬃﬃﬃ
type, r= n would rapidly decrease so that the separations
between accumulating mean values would approach five
standard errors of the mean provided that the standard deviation exceeded one. To put these numbers in context suppose
for the moment that the underlying distributions are normal.
Then, taking the number of public elementary, middle, and
high schools in the United States to be 100 000,25 and assuming that each school has 1000 rooms and that there is an
Luzi et al.
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acoustic event in each of these rooms once an hour for 24 h
every day of the year, five sigma implies one false call will
be made per century. While some of the numbers in this estimate may seem high, particularly the number of rooms per
school, they have been chosen in order to provide an overestimate of the possible error rate.
Second, the expense of an expanded study to measure
the distributions of log½Ef  and Hf ;gi is justified. The value of
such an expanded study would lie in its use for design of an
automated processing algorithm for detection of firearm discharges in public gathering places as well as the identification of firearm type.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was funded by internal R&D funds at PNNL
including the Signature Discovery Initiative. In addition, we
would like to thank Steve Meyer, Special Response Team
Commander, and Officers Barry Woodson and Steve Voit of
the Hanford Patrol (U.S. Department of Energy) who
assisted in acquisition of firearms data during the initial
stages of this investigation. J.E.M. was partially supported
by NSF grant DMS 1300280. M.S.H. and J.E.M. have a
financial (ownership) interest in EntropyVision Inc. and may
financially benefit if the company is successful in marketing
its products that are related to this research.
APPENDIX

While it appears to be widely accepted that firearm
discharges are capable of producing hearing loss, and thus
exceed 140 dB levels required for this to occur, we have
been unable to find refereed sources providing quantitative
sound levels for specific measurement positions relative to
the location of the firearm barrel. Several web sites contain
data and plots, for instance: http://www.freehearingtest.com/
hia_gunfirenoise.shtml or for more detailed description of
actual measurements: Kyttala and Paakonen (1995):
“Suppressors and shooting range structures” (http://
www.guns.connect.fi/rs/suppress.html), which shows 160 dB
maximum levels for a shooter firing a FN FAL L1A1 assault
rifle using. 308 Win standard high velocity ammunition.
This matches the maximum safe operating level for the
InvenSense INMP404ACEZ-R7 microphone used in our
study, which indicates some risk in employing this device.
Nevertheless, as our goal was demonstration of a low-cost,
hence widely deployable, sensor we decided to proceed
using the following precautions. First, rough amplitude comparisons of microphone output before and after a subset of
the firearm discharges were performed using acoustic sources like the “wrench” and “book slap” to check for obvious
changes in microphone output amplitude or shape. Second,
the transducer was located at least 2 m from the acoustic
source (firearm) during all testing, and probably experienced
peak sound levels below 160 dB. Third, as it true for most
engineering tolerances, the 160 dB safe operating level published by the manufacturer has probably been “de-rated” to
provide an extra margin for safe use and is below the actual
noise level at which the microphone suffers permanent
J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 139 (5), May 2016

damage. Fourth, and most important, quantitative comparisons of spectral characteristics of the microphone with
unused microphones of the same manufacture could be performed at the conclusion of the study to rule out the possibility of microphone damage.
These quantitative comparisons were performed using
four InvenSense INMP404ACEZ-R7 microphones that were
not exposed to firearm discharges. The apparatus used to
make these measurements is shown in Fig. 7. The speaker, a
Sontron SPS-29-T00 piezo-ceramic with a 20 mm diameter,
was used to drive the microphone under test. Given the constraints imposed by laboratory space and the desire to minimize cable lengths for the electronic components, it was
placed 42.8 cm away from the microphone. This is greater
than the near-to-far field transition point, for 26 kHz, which
occurs at 6.1 cm.
In order to ensure measurement of all microphones
occurred in their linear response regime, calibration curves
were acquired by measuring spectra of received pulses
obtained by driving the broadband-amplifier with a 2 ls step
function pulse from the Tektronix AFG 3252C set to a height
of either 1.5, 1.0. 0.5, 0.25, or 0.125 V. These measurements
simultaneously verify the linearity of all components in the
measurement chain: Tektronix AFG 3252C, HP 6327A,
speaker and microphone. Typical curves, in this case the
family obtained using the prototype microphone, are shown
in Fig. 8. The top curve, labelled 1.25 V, is 3.5 dB above the
calibration curve corresponding to an amplified 1.00 V step
function excitation, as expected. The remaining curves are
all 6 dB apart, also as expected. Since the 0.5 V labelled
curve appears to be well within the linear range of the measurement apparatus this driving level was used for all
spectral characterizations.

FIG. 7. Equipment diagram showing electronics used for measurements of
spectral characteristics of InvenSense INMP404ACEZ-R7 microphones
used in our study.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Typical calibration curves used to determine the amplitude of the square wave used for spectral measurements.

Spectra were obtained using the following protocol.
The prototype used to obtain firearm discharge data was
placed in a clamp and aligned for maximum amplitude and
arrival time of 1.25 ms (corresponding to 42.8 cm assuming
a speed of sound of 343 m/s). The average of 256 pulses
from the speaker were stored for later off-line analysis.
Next, an unused microphone was placed in the clamp, its
position and alignment similarly adjusted and the average
of 256 pulses from the speaker were averaged and stored.
This process was repeated for the remaining three unused
microphones.
This cycle was repeated five times. Subsequently, the
data were analyzed by baseline removal, windowing to eliminate spurious pulses and reduce noise using a 1 ms window.
As the microphones exhibit variations in output amplitude, all
pulses were then scaled to a maximum deviation, from DC, of
one. This permits more precise comparison of the shapes of
the spectra. Next, each of the rescaled pulses were Fourier
transformed and their magnitudes as functions of frequency,
i.e., the spectra, were computed. The five spectra from the
prototype were averaged. Their standard deviations were also
computed. The same processing was performed on each of the
twenty pulses obtained from the unused microphones and
these were averaged and the standard deviation computed.
We point out that the rescaling performed in the time domain
had the effect of reducing the resulting standard deviation of
the ensemble of twenty spectra and thus produces a more
stringent comparison between prototype and unused microphone spectra.
The comparison of average prototype and average
unused microphone spectra over a range extending from 0 to
28.6 kHz is shown in Fig. 9. The averaged (N ¼ 5) spectra
for the prototype with standard deviation error bars are
represented in the solid curve without plot symbols. The
average (N ¼ 20) spectra for the unused microphones are
represented by the curve with circular symbols. The plots are
2730
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Comparison of spectra of prototype microphone after
study completion with the average of five spectra obtained from unused microphone of the same manufacture. Standard deviation bars are also plotted.

essentially the same over the 1 to 26 kHz range used to bandpass filter all time domain data prior to the analysis that
produced the comparisons shown in Figs. 3 and 5.
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